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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLAIR H. ANDERSON, E. DARLENE
ANDERSON, his wife, DIRK C.
ANDERSON, and JUDY ANDERSON,
his wife,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants

CASE NO. 18178

vs.
AMERICAN SAVINGS AND LOAN,
a Utah corporation,
Defendant and
Respondant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for determination and declaration of the
respective parties' interest in real property, being lot 17 A-D
Westhampton Planned Unit Development.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The lower court granted defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment without explanation.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks an Order reversing the Order of the District
Court and for determination of the legal issue whether defendant
has record priority because its recording number is lower.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
The parties agreed to stipulated facts that include, by
adoption, the status of the record of the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office (R 12-18).

The depositions of three of

the defendants were taken and pliblished at the time of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (R 81-154).

There are also

affidavits of Bruce Hancey, an employee of Utah Title .company
(R 19-31); David

c.

Kimball, an employee of American Savings

and Loan Association, the defendant (R 52-65); Clair H. Anderson, one of the plaintiffs (R72-73); and Dirk C. Anderson,
another of the plaintiffs (R 74-75).
Defendant brought a Motion for Summary Judgment, and
plaintiff brought a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Both

parties prepared extensive memoranda in support of their respective Motions and in opposition to the Motion of the other.
Defendant's memorandum is included in the record.

Plaintiffs'

memorandum, a copy of which was filed with the docketing statement as a description of plaintiffs' claims as to the law, is
not included in the record for reasons that are not clear to
plaintiffs' counsel.

A copy of said memorandum was in the

hands of Judge G. Hal Taylor at the time of argument on the
Motions for Summary Judgment.
The facts are detailed in the Stipulated Statement of Facts.
Plaintiffs will here recite in narrative form the most essential of those facts.

They are:

-2-
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PlGintiffs purchased unit #4, Westhampton Planned Unit
Development from Great West Development Company.

As part of

the consideration, said seller agreed to construct a specific
4-plex thereon for an agreed additional price of $95,000.00,
which was advantageous to plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs later agreed

to forego that seller's agreement to construct the 4-plex for
that advantageous price and to exchange lot 4 A-D for lot 17
A-D for an agreed price, part of which was paid in cash and
part of which was paid by Great West Development Company's
promissory note secured by a trust deed on said lot 17 A-D.
Larry Myers and others who were the principals of Great
West Development Company gave defendant a trust deed for the
peoperty, including lot 17 A-D.
that time.

They did not have title at

The determination of the respective priorities of

that trust deed and the trust deed of plaintiffs is what this
lawsuit is about.
The date of Great West Development Company 1 s trust deed
to plaintiffs was April 30, 1979.

By a deed bearing that same

date, Great West Development Company conveyed title to the
property described in defendant's trust deed to Larry Myers
and others who were granters in defendant's trust deed.

On

the next day (May 1, 1979) both trust deeds and the conveyance
by plaintiffs' granter (Great West Development Company) to defendant's granter, Larry Myers and others, were recorded at exactly the same time, to wit: 11:02 a.m.

The recording number

assigned to defendant's trust deed was lower than the one assigned to plaintiffs' trust deed.
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The affidavit of Bruce Haney (R 19-31)_ claims that he
was present when Larry B. Myers informed plaintiffs that their
trust deed would be subordinate to defendant's trust deed and
that he was instructed by defendant to record so that defendant's trust deed would be prior.
pate in those instructions.
Dirk

c.

Plaintiffs did not partici-

Plaintiffs Clair H. Anderson and

Anderson each denied having been told that their trust

deed would be subordinate, and they each denied agreeing to or
acquiescing in such subordination (R-72-75).
In their depositions both Clair H. Anderson (R 117-154)
and Dirk

c.

Anderson (R 81-107) acknowledged that they under-

stood that defendant wanted a first trust deed position, and
each vigorously denied that he was told or that he agreed that
their trust deed would be: subordinate.

Both of said plain-

tiffs made affidavits explaining their· understanding of "First
Trust Deed Position" was that it was necessary to get title to
the entire development project in a common granter and that anyone that granter gave a trust deed to would have a "first trust
deed" even if that granter gave consecutive trust deeds (R 72
and R 74}.

Both of said plaintiffs corrected their depositions

to indicate that understanding prior to signing them (R 108 and
:R 145) •
It is also important to note that while each of said
plaintiffs said he knew defendant wanted a first trust deed
position,

(a fact each Plaintiff would still acknowledge) each

also says that he did not agree that Defendant should have a

-4Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

first trust deed position, and both of them vigorously resisted,
in spite of defendant's counsel's badgering that they agreed to
accept a subordinate position or that they were told that their
position would be subordinate (R 99, lines 1-16; R 102, lines
1-18; R 131, lines 9-12; and R 140, lines 1-5).
Plaintiffs acknowledge that they understood that defendant
wanted clear title to lot 4 A-D, the lot they exchanged for lot
17 A-D,because that is where the developer intended to begin
construction.
The fourth cause of action of plaintiffs' Complaint is a
claim that defendant agreed to loan monies for development of
the property which was relied upon by plaintiffs when they agreed
to exchange the lots and by others; that defendant knew of that
reliance and, nonetheless, failed to loan all of the monies it
had agreed to and that plaintiffs were damaged thereby.
It is fair to say that plaintiffs' knowledge of the justification for defendant's failure to loan all of the monies it
agreed to loan was deficient when their depositions were taken.
They merely said they had been told the problems were due to
Defendant's holding up on its draws.

In their Memorandum on

Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, plaintiffs advised the
court of their desire and intention to do further discovery on
that matter.

(See plaintiffs' Memorandum attached to Docketing

Statement, Point V.}

The affidavit of David G. Kimball

(R-

52

and 53} described Defendant's disbursements in connection with
the loan.

It is not contradicted.
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ARGUMENT
I

PLAINTIFFS' TRUST DEED IS PRIOR TO DEFENDANT'S TRUST
DEED.

Plaintiffs agreed to stipulate to the facts to test defendant's contention that defendant's lower recording number was
dispositive as against plaintiffs' contention that it had record priority or, at the worst, record parity.

On that matter,

the facts are contained in the records of the county recorder's
off ice, unchangeable and largel.y uncolorable by either party.
Plaintiffs asked the District Court to make a determination of
that issue and now ask this Court to make that determination or
to instruct the lower court to do so.

If the matter is to be

determined on the basis of either the silent or expressed intention of the parties, there is a factual dispute which will
require a trial.

That matter will be argued more fully in

Argument IV.
On the record, plaintiffs received their trust deed from
Great West Development Company.

Defendant received its trust

deed from certain individuals who received title from Great
West Development Company.

It follows that the world is informed

by the record that plaintiffs' trust deed was prior to defendant's
trust deed because defendant's granters received title after
those same granters gave plaintiffs their trust deed.

The only

other alternative is that plaintiffs' granters gave title to
defendant's granters and then gave plaintiffs an empty trust
deed at a time when they no longer had title, a result that
assumes a fradulent conveyance to plaintiffs by plaintiffs'
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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granter and defendant's grantor and which plaintiff claims is
contrary to usual human experience and, therefore, is unreasonable.
Note all of the documents here relied upon were recorded
at the same time, to wit: 11:02 a.m. on May 1, 1979.
Plaintiff urges that the only, or certinly the most, reasonable construction of the record title by this Court or by
the world re:eorting to the record to determine title was that
plaintiffs obtained their trust deed from their grantors prior
to the time defendant received its trust deed from the grantees
of plaintiffs' granters.
If we consider the problem aside from :the record, it is
clear the documents were in the hands of Utah

~itle

Company who

was instructed by Defendant, and, therefore, was defendant's
agent, prior to the documents' being recorded.

(See stipulated

fact #6 (R-13)H, tit::follavs that the presumptions hereinabove urged
regarding the record are the same or more emphatic aside from
the record--that is, defendant or its agent, Utah Title, must
have known that the only reasonable construction of the documents was that plaintiffs received their trust deed prior to defendant's receiving its trust deed.

Perhaps more importantly,

the obvious expertise of defendant and its agent, Utah Title
Company, and their opportunity to recognize the problem before
recording and to correct it by obtaining a written subordination agreement from plaintiffs belies their claim that plaintiffs
understood or agreed that defendant was to have a prior lien on
lot 17 A-D.

-7-
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ARGUMENT
II
IF PLAINTIFFS' TRUST DEED IS NOT PRIOR TO
DEFENDANT"S TRUST DEED FOR THE REASONS URGED
IN ARGUMENT I, PLAINTIFFS' TRUST DEED AND DEFENDANT'S TRUST DEED ARE CONTEMPORANEOUS PER
THE RECORD BECAUSE THEY WERE RECORDED AT THE
SAME TIME.
This is the legal question about which the parties emphatically disagree.
tioned Argument II.

Plaintiffs' claim is as stated in the capDefendant's claim is that because its

trust deed, though recorded at exactly the same minute as Plaintiffs' trust deed, to wit:

at 11:02 a.m. on May 1, 1979, was

accorded lower recording number, it is prior.

Defendant simply

cites the statute saying the first deed recorded takes precedence over subs_equent deeds recorded and then assumes the lower
recording number indicates an earlier recording.

But, while

that analysis may be comforting to defendant, it is not supportable, either practically or legally.

Practically, if documents

are received by the recorder at the same instant, one must be
accorded a higher number than the other, but that is no reason
to prefer one over the other by according it a higher priority.
As to the law, UCA 57-3-2 is as follows:
57-3-2 Record Imparts Notice. Every conveyance, or instrument in writing affecting real estate, executed, acknowledged or proved, and certified, in the manner prescribed by this title, and
every patent to land within this state duly executed
and verified according to law, and every judgment,
order or decree of any court of record in this state,
or a copy thereof, required by law to be recorded in
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the off ice of the county recorder shall, from the
time of filing the same with the recorder for record,
impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof;
and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees and lien holders
shall be deemed would purchase and take with notice.
66 Am Jur 2nd, sections 153 to 155 of the title "Records and
Recording Laws" describes the rule.

A careful reading of sec-

tions 154 and 155 discloses that when the instruments are properly
recorded within a reasonable time, the priorities will date from
the time of filing.

The point is made, somewhat brutally to de-

fendant's position, but nonetheless more clearly, in the case of

Bonstein

v~

Schweyer et al,

61 A 447, a 1905 Pennsylvania case.

ter noting that it is not really a

qu~stion,

Af-

but must be passed

upon because it had been raised, the Court said:
These two mortgages were left at the office for record
on the same day and at the same moment of time--9:30
a.m., April 14, 1877. Neither had priority over the
other. The lien of each commenced at precisely the same
moment. There can be no answer to this in the face of
the words of the statute, but the appellants contend,
and with apparent seriousness, that the lien of the
mortgage given to the widow was prior to that of the
one given to the daughter, because, according to the
pages in the mortgage book, it was recorded first.
It
was recorded on page 81, and other on page 83, and the
position of the appellants, as they state it, is "that
the paging in the mortgage book conclusively establishes
the priority of entry," and therefore priority of lien.
It was impossible to record the two mortgages at the same
instant in the same mortgage book. One had to appear
there first, but the page on which it appeared had
nothing to do with its lien. That commenced the moment
the arrival of the mortgage in the recorder's office was
noted by the recorder, and in contemplation of law it
was recorded from the moment it was left for record.
As a matter of universal experience, we know that mortgages and deeds are not actually recorded as soon as they
are brought into the office, because it is not possible
to so record them. They accumulate in the off ice for
record. Those brought first are first recorded, and in
time all are recorded. Under the contention of the
appellants, as it must be understood, no mortgagee is
safe with the_ lien of his mortgage, as against other
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other mortgagees, until his mortgage is actually recorded
in the mortgage book. Of this proposition serious consideration could hardly be expected, and certainly will
not be given to it.
While that is an old case, it did address the exact
problem presented in this case in a direct way.

Plaintiffs are

not aware of any cases to the contrary and believe there are none.
ARGUMENT
III
PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO PRIORITY BECAUSE THEIRS
WAS A PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGE.

Apparently it is agreed that if plaintiffs' trust deed is
fairly characterized as a. purchase money mortgage, it is prior
and plaintiffs will not here reiterate the law of purchase money
mortgages, except to note that it also is applicable to trust
deeds.
The problem is that plaintiffs in this case sold one lot
of the. development and took a trust deed on another l.ot of the
same development.

Plaintiffs understood that Great West Develop-

ment Company, defendant's mortgagor needed clear title to lot 4
A-D and made the exchange in that way to accommodate that need.
Defendant has cited the rule as outlined in
asserted that this case does not fit.

Am '1cr

2nd and simply

Plaintiffs acknowledge

that the case is apparently one of first impression.
The rule from 55 Am Jur 2nd Mortgages Section 348 is as
follows:
§348. Generally
A mortgage on land executed to secure the purchase
money by a purchaser of the land contemporaneously with
the acquisition of the legal title thereto, or afterward, but as a part of the same transaction, is a purchase money mortgage.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The black letter print rule in 58 CJS Section 231 a, of
Mortgages is as follows:
§231.

Priority of Purchase-Money Mortgages
a. In General. A mortgage given for unpaid purchase money on a sale of land, as part of the same transaction as the deed, generally takes precedence over all
other existing and subsequent claims and liens against
the mortgagor.
The statement in American Law of Property IV, Section
16.106 E Purchase Money

Mor~gages

at page 220 is as follows:

It is familiar learning that a purchase money mortgage, executed at the same time as the deed of purchase
of land, or in pursuance of agreement as part of one
continuous transaction, takes precedence over any other
claim or lien attaching to the property through the
vende.e-mortgagor.
While it is fairly possible to make defendant's argument
using the Am Jur 2nd definition because of the words "the land,"
it is impossible to make that argument from the CJS definition
or the American Law of Property definition.

Plaintiffs urge

that the Am Jur 2nd definition would be as accurate if the word
"the" in "the land 11 was omitted and that definition would then
square with the other two.
But let us talk about the purpose of the rule as applied
to the facts of this case.

Plaintiffs submit the purpose of the

rule was to make it clear that mortgagees such as Plaintiffs received their security interest ahead of claims against the mortgagor that attached automatically upon the vesting of title in
that mortgagor, such as execution liens, welfare liens, dower,
homestead interests or mortgages executed by the mortgagor previously in anticipation of receipt of title about which mort-11-
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gagees such as plaintiffs could not easily protect themselves
for want of knowledge of such interests.

In this case, defen-

dant asserts priority based upon a mortgage it received previously from a party who did not have title when it gave the trust
d~ed

to defendant as against a trust deed given to plaintiffs by

the then owner of the property before it conveyed the property
to the party who had given the trust deed to defendant.

Note

that if or when plaintiffs checked title before accepting their
trust deed, their granter had clear title.

Even if plaintiffs

knew of defendant's trust deed, which plaintiffs do not concede,
they would not have been concerned about it because the granter
of that trust deed did not have title; plaintiffs' granter had
title.
Plaintiffs respectfully urge that they did have a purchase
money mortgage under a proper definition of that phrase and that
the reasons for the rule giving priority to purchase money mortgagees, such as plaintiffs, that is, to protect them from hidden
interests that become effective only on a transfer of title that
triggers the competing interest, exist in this case and require
a recognition of plaintiffs' priority under the purchase money
mortgage doctrine.

ARGUMENT
IV

IF THE MATTER IS TO BE DETEF.MINED UPON THE BASIS
OF THE SILENT OR EXPRESSED INTENTION OF THE PARTIES, THERE IS A FACTUAL DISPUTE AND PLAINTIFFS
ARE ENTITLED TO A TRIAL.

-12Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs concede that if they agreed or consented that
their claim would be subordinate, it is.

They cannot dispute

defendant's present claim that it intended to obtain priority,
but they claim they did not acquiesce or agree to it and that
defendant did not communicate it to them.

If defendant origin-

ally intended that plaintiffs' claim be subordinate, it could
easily have prepared an agreement to that effect.
ments are usual and extensively used.
propose or obtain such agreement.

Such agree-

But defendant did not

That it did not, strongly be-

lies its claim that such was intended or, at best, indicates it
intended to obtain an advantage by s.ilent conduct.
Defendant has seized upon plaintiffs' saying in their depositions that they understood that defendant wanted a first trust
deed position as a concess.ion that plaintiffs agreed to subordinate their trust deed.

In the first place, plaintiffs' attorney

would now stipulate that defendant wanted a first trust deed
position--(After all, who doesn't?); but plaintiffs did not agree
or consent that their trust deed would be subordinate to effect
that result.

Defendant's counsel at the same depositions, at-

tempted to establish such agreement, but without success.

On

page 18 (R 99) of Dirk Anderson's deposition the following exchange between Rappaport and Dirk Anderson occurred:
(By Mr. Rappaport) Could you please answer the
question? Did you understand that the trust deed that
you and your wife and your mother and father were getting for approximately $31,000 was going to be second
to the trust deed of American Savings?
Q

A I understood that that was just to secure our money,
that we would still have an interest in that property
to secure our money.
-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Q Right. And you understood that American Savings
wanted a first trust deed position on all the lots?
A

Right.

And that you would be second to their trust deed?
Your trust deed would be second to their trust deed?
Did you understand that?

Q

Well, all I understood was that was securing our
money.

A

That issue was picked up by Barnes at page 21 (R 102):
Q Did you have an understanding about the financing?
Would that also affect your lot?

A

Yeah.

It would affect our lot.

So you knew that they were buying back those lots
so that they could obtain financing?

Q

A

Right.

And that that financing would also involve your lot;
is that correct?

Q

A

Yes.

What was your understanding about where you would fall
in. line with the bank? Who would have a first interest,
and who would have a second interest?

Q

A My understanding was that we would get paid off as
soon as that building was built.
Q But you were aware, also, that the reason for this
whole deeding back and receiving an interest in the lot
was so that the financing for the Myer project could be
arranged?

A

Right.

In' Clair Anderson's deposition at page 14 (R 131), Rappaport asked again, and again he got a negative answer:
Q You were aware that the bank was going to be having
a blanket loan on the whole project, and that your note
and trust deed came after that?

A

I wasn't aware of that, no.

-14Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

And at page 20 (R 137), he tried again:
No one told you that you were going to be paid before
the loan to American Savings was paid; is that right?

Q

A

They never said anything about it.

And at page 23 (R 140), he tried again:
That the American Savings would have clear title and
first position?

Q

A

Well, I don't know about first position.

Q

But clear title?

A Clear title.
It is fa.ir to say that while plaintiffs in their depositions acknowledged that defendant wanted clear title to lot 4 A-D to
make their loan and that they wanted a first trust deed position,
they consistently refused to agree, although badgered to, that
they agreed to take or understood that defendant expected them
to take a subordinate position.
Moreover, had they explained to plaintiffs what they meant
by a first trust deed position or asked them what they understood
by the phrase "a first trust deed position," they would have discovered that plaintiffs' understanding was simply that it was
necessary to get title in all of the lots in common ownership
and that anyone receiving a trust deed from that owner would have
a first trust deed, and further, that that owner could then give
any number of first trust deeds.

See plaintiffs Clair Anderson's

and Dirk Anderson's Affidavits attached hereto (R 72-75), and
see plaintiffs' explanations of their answers given at the time
of deposition.
Plaintiffs are reluctant to assert a semantic misunderstanding in defense of defendant's claims, but feel they must
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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because the misunderstanding exists.

They also claim that, ab-

sent that misunderstanding, all they conceded was a knowledge
that defendant wanted a first trust deed position--a concession
they would still make.

Plaintiffs further contend that their

persistant denial of the further questions as to whether they
intended to take or even that they understood defendant intended
them to take a s.ubordinate position should have alerted defendant's counsel to the communication failure.
Plaintiffs also deny the claim in Bruce Hancey's Affidavit (R 19) that that matter was explained to them.

While Dirk

Anderson agreed that Myers coul.d have explained that defendant
wanted a first trust deed position, he denies that Myers or anyone explained that plaintiffs' position was to be subordinate.
(R 74-75)

Plaintiffs urge the Court that if American Savings or its
agent Utah Title intended that plaintiffs should have a subordinate position, they could have and should have said so in writing.
Both of said institutions are highly expert in dealing adequately
with this kind of transaction and knew how to memorialize the
agreement that they now claim existed.

That they didn't, strongly

belies their claim.
Plaintiffs further urge that defendant or its agent Utah
Title prepared the documents and recorded them.

If they are

ambiguous, that ambiguity should be resolved against defendant.
Plaintiffs urge the Court to decide the matter based on the objective non-colorable record that is available to it:
upon the records of the County Recorder's office.
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It is some-
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how unbecoming of these giants, American Savings and Utah Title,
who controlled the creation of the documents and the recording
of them to now say they intended, by a sneaky procedure, to put
plaintiffs in a second lien position, even though an analysis
of the record at the time plaintiffs took their trust deed would
have suggested they were getting a first lien position.

But

since they have failed to accomplish that sneaky result, they
now ask the Court to decide that plaintiffs intended all along
to get something less than the record, controlled by defendant,
gave them.

Aside from its uncomliness, it is untrue.

Plaintiffs

never agreed or intended their trust deed to be subordinate to
defendant's.
ARGUMENT

v
PLAINTIFFS' FOURTH CAUSEOF ACTION IS NOT IN
POSITION TO BE DECIDED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Plaintiffs understand another group of parties has sued
defendant upon a claim similar to that addressed in plaintiffs'
fourth claim.

Plaintiffs have asserted that claim because they

are in the same class as the other parties, but have not yet
initiated discovery regarding that claim.

Counsel for both par-

ties agreed to cooperate to dispose of plaintiffs' first three
claims by stipulating to the facts that affect them and testing
the matter by a Motion for Sununary Judgment.
plaintiffs' energies have been directed.

That is where

They still want an

opportunity to discover the facts respecting their fourth claim.
Defendant has exaggerated plaintiffs' unconcern and lack
of information regarding their fourth claim.

At page 18-19 of
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Dirk Anderson 1 s deposition

(R

99-100), Rappaport asked and Dirk

answered as follows:
I'd like to ask you the same question concerning
the fourth claim of your complaint. I'd appreciate
it if you haven't before, if you could read paragraphs
19, 20, and 21. Can you tell us what specific facts
you know or have heard of that support the allegations
in paragraphs 19, 20 and 21?

Q

A Spring of '78 -- '77. When I met those two
after trying to meet with them several times,- that's
what they indicated; that they were having a problem,
and that American Savings had agreed to give them the
money, but they were holding up on their draws, and
they couldn't get any money to finish the project.
Did they say why American was holding up on its
draws?

Q

A No.

So that's all that you know is that Larry Myers
and Larry Price said American was holding up on the
draws?

Q

A

Yes.

That is all of Rappaport's examination about plaintiffs'
fourth claim.

All of Barnes' examination related to the time

of closing.

Dirk's answers indicated only his understanding at

that time.

It is much afterward that plaintiffs claim that de-

fendant failed to perform its agreement.
Plaintiffs both testified as to some knowledge of defendant's promises to finance the developer even at the time of
the closing (R 99 and R 141) •

They were informed in substan-

tially more detail at a later time and still wish to investigate
the facts of that matter further.
Dirk's father testified that he relied on Dirk in this
transaction.

He further testified that he understood generally
-18-
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that defendant had agreed to the development loan and that he
had been advised by the developer that defendant had failed to
make disbursements and the development failed because of that.
(See Deposition, pages 24-25.)

(R

141-142)

Clair Anderson's

answer that he didn't care about the financing or the specific
arrangements is not referenced in time.

It appears to admit

an unconcern and lack of knowledge at the time of the closing
and has been corrected to show that.

CONCLUSION
1.

Plaintiffs' trust deed is prior to defendant's trust

deed and that priority is observable from the record because it
was given to plaintiffs by a party prior in title to the party
that gave the trust deed to defendant.
2.

If plaintiffs' trust deed is not prior, it is contem-

poraneous because it was recorded at the same time as defendant's
trust deed.
3.

Plaintiffs' trust deed is entitled to priority because

it is a purchase money mortgage.
4.

Plaintiffs did not agree to, consent to or acquiesce

to take a subordinate position to defendant.
5.

Plaintiffs have not initiated discovery per their

fourth claim, but still intend to do so.
or conceded their claim away.

They have not admitted

The matter is not in a posture to

be determined by Summary Judgment at this time.
Plaintiffs respectfully urge the Court to rule or to in-
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struct the lower court to rule that the record title of plaintiffs'
trust deed is prior to defendant's trust deed; or, in the alternative, that such record title is contemporaneous.
Inasmuch as Judge Taylor's decision is unexplained, plaintiffs believe they will be required to file a reply memorandum
after they discover how defendant justifies Judge Taylor's decision.

Respectfully submitted,

GERALD E. NIELSON
Attorney for Plaintiffs Anderson
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